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Creolizing Political Institutions  
Jane Anna Gordon 
UCONN-Storrs 
When completing the manuscript that became Creolizing Political Theory, 
I thought I had written what I had to say on this theme and would therefore 
turn to other, for me, new and distinct projects.1 As I began actually to 
undertake them, however, I realized that if the whole point of creolizing 
were that it is a living manifestation of rigorous thinking, trying to leave it 
behind would be a mistake.  
This was clear first when developing a course focused on Historical 
Women Political Thinkers.  Using Lewis Gordon’s Introduction to Africana 
Philosophy as a model, I wanted to see if unique themes emerged as women 
wrote about and argued for their substantive inclusion in political life, as 
had been the case when black writers across the Euromodern world 
undertook philosophical reflection.2  Without the lens of creolization, I likely 
would have determined the selection of figures and texts quite differently.  
My primary interest was in looking at any and all works I could identify, but 
especially those that long pre-dated contemporary Euro-American feminist 
theory. As Penny Weiss observed, they exist in wonderful abundance, with 
origins across centuries and the globe.3 I assumed that how being female 
informed political reflection would be expressed very differently in the hands 
of a 15th-century Italian-French self-supporting scribe turned writer, a 17th-
century Ethiopian anti-colonial charismatic religious leader, an 18th-century 
Afro-Caribbean enslaved woman turned abolitionist activist, a 19th-century 
Eastern European revolutionary Marxist or Chinese anarchist, and a 20th-
century Chicana.  But what emerged with surprising regularity were, among 
other themes, grappling with the supposed illegitimacy of women as 
political thinkers and actors, their presumed monstrosity as they advanced 
conceptions of fundamentally altered ways of reproducing the human 
species, and concern with how distinct obligations tied to the ability to give 
birth informed analyses of war and other political conditions that led to 
premature and callous loss of life.  
Similarly, in the research I am currently undertaking that explores 
statelessness and contemporary enslavement as core, rather than 
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aberrational features, of Euromodern political life, creolizing approaches 
emerged as necessary.  On the matter of statelessness, it became clear that 
discussions of the theme undertaken among human rights scholar-activists 
and international lawyers had largely not been and must be put into 
conversation with historic and contemporary work on settler colonialism 
and indigenous thought and practice.  Likewise, while it is indisputable that 
the trans-Atlantic trade racialized enslavement in ways without precedent 
that continue to cast a dense shadow over legally free black subjects, forced 
labor in the current moment combines older and newer political economic 
developments.  This has led me to argue, against many detractors, that it is 
accurate to call some contemporary forms of unfreedom “slavery.” This 
project culminates in an unapologetic effort to rethink political institutions 
in ways that respond directly to the anti-statism that currently abounds on 
the intellectual left.  In short, in ways to which I will return at greater length, 
I contend that we must treat political institutions as creatures for which we 
are undoubtedly responsible and for which we must therefore fight with all 
of our creative resources.  In so doing, I am joining scholars primarily 
engaged with Latin American political thought and practice, including 
Enrique Dussel’s explorations translated into English as Twenty Theses on 
Politics, George Ciccariello-Maher’s We Created Chavez, Katherine Gordy’s 
Living Ideology in Cuba, and Angélica Maria Bernal’s Beyond Origins.4 
A central element of this challenge is illuminated by the work of 
Nathalie Etoke, as evident in this symposium and beyond it.5 Part of what 
first motivated me to read Rousseau through Africana and Francophone 
Africana resources was that it struck me that an actual general will—one as 
general as the society itself—would be incredibly difficult for advantaged 
members of a polity to grasp.  After all, they were regularly indulged in 
treating their highly particular and often parochial vantage points as 
isomorphic with reality itself.  By contrast, it was racialized-colonized 
residents who knew the putative ideals of the societies of which they were 
apart along with their ongoing and fundamental compromising.  Surely it 
was they who were potentially better poised to work through these 
contradictions to fathom a better approximation of the common good. My 
hope was for a “better approximation” rather than a “better 
accomplishment” because I assumed that a feature of emancipatory political 
action is its incompleteness, in the sense that it brings new conditions into 
being.  As it does so, ways of being a person emerge along with 
predicaments that cannot be anticipated. Additionally, as I will return to 
with my discussion of Kevin Bruyneel’s contribution to this symposium, 
even progressive actors frequently reproduce what is liminal to the settler 
colonial societies in which they reside. As I tried to struggle through this 
intuition in my dissertation, I had argued that in a society like the United 
States, it would be political subjects with what W.E.B. Du Bois called double 
consciousness and Paget Henry rearticulated as potentiated double consciousness 
who could best articulate a general will.6 At the same time, their very ability 
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to do so made it unlikely people committed to a will of some masquerading as 
a general will would actually listen. Given the Francophone origins of the 
general will and the debates that were then raging over the permissibility of 
wearing hijabs in public spaces, especially in schools, I reached similar 
conclusions regarding that situation.  In short, it was so clearly wrong that 
Muslim and non-Muslim African-descended French subjects, in seeking to 
be part of the French Republic, were framed as divisive, sullying, through 
their identitarianism or assertion of cultural backwardness, an otherwise 
vital general will.  Instead, an actual general will, as opposed to a will of a 
select few of the French Republic, had to grapple with what they and these 
subjects, likely to be in the vanguard of such political reflection, shared.  
The contemporary French leaders, as Nathalie Etoke observes, who, 
without any sense of irony, declare that France now seeks to turn inward, 
away from its previously imperial orientation, should be visited by the ghost of 
Aimé Césaire.7  He would remind them that a distinctive feature of European 
political history and culture was its claimed ability to insulate itself from 
what transpired in its colonies.  This was as evident in the claim that mere 
contact with French or English soil turned the slave into a free man or 
woman as that the callous brutality unleashed in the Caribbean and in 
Africa was the work of creoles, not French- or Englishmen.  In fact, Césaire 
insisted, it was Europeans who were “settling” thoroughly occupied polities 
in the Americas, Africa, and Asia through torture, dispossession, and 
murder. Meanwhile, it was their counterparts in mainland, continental 
Europe who stomached this as acceptable Christian, European, and 
civilizing policy.  But Césaire’s point wasn’t simply to engage in moral 
criticism. The aim was historical diagnosis: the transformations to the 
colonizers produced by their colonial endeavors returned home with them. 
It was not true that they could practice democracy at home and fascism 
abroad, for they returned with their sensibilities and characteristics. The 
implications were that what transpired as the supposedly extreme and 
exceptional events of the holocaust were nothing more than colonial policy 
returned home as domestic practice, colonial policy unleashed on fellow 
Europeans.  We are in a similar moment now.  With a globe made smaller by 
technologies that accelerate the speed of movement of people, goods, and 
ideas, the physical and psychic distance that Europe maintained from its 
colonies is collapsing.  The moment exemplifies Patrick Wolfe’s claim that 
practices of racialization or of racist violence intensify as colonizers are 
forced to share what they consider their spaces with the people they have 
colonized.8  In short, the French leadership quoted by Etoke would rather 
hollow out the French state, ever narrowing the nation to which it refers and 
how they should thereby benefit, than having it embody the actual range of 
people and processes that generated its current form.  Etoke underscores the 
especially stark irony of the French case.  After all, it is no accident that the 
Francophone world is at the center of studies and debates over creolization.  
French and Francophone scholars authored most of its central terms and 
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texts.  Still, or for precisely this reason, as French-speaking African peoples 
come to the metropole seeking a polity and political institutions that reflect 
the Francophone world’s actual constitution, they are told not only that they 
are extraneous, but also that their presence is illicit. They exemplify the 
distinction between assimilation and creolization.  If the former were an 
option, these Francophone subjects could become French by ceasing to be 
who they are.  Creolization charts an alter-native (a linguistic move made by 
Sandy Grande) that does not leave such a singularly violent and 
exclusionary standard intact.9  
Creolizing French political institutions and identities would have to 
resemble Etoke’s own explorations in film that bring together different 
modes of analysis—those expressed in literature, philosophy, and song—to 
convey what it is to resist being cast into the zone of nonbeing.10 In so doing, 
Etoke affirms, as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Frantz Fanon, among many 
others, so compellingly argued, the production of knowledge cannot be 
disentangled from the colonial world of which it is part.  What will be prized 
and treated as authoritative, after all, is not generated in a vacuum.  
Although academic and intellectual spaces are internally complex ones in 
which varieties of projects are undertaken, what Kevin Bruyneel calls 
“settler memory” organizes and prioritizes hegemonic accounts of what is 
worth knowing. At the same time, as Bruyneel illustrates, the actual history 
of the United States (or Canada or France) is far more creolized than the 
ways in which it is mobilized ideologically as memory.   
 What then would it mean for collective U.S. memory (or how history 
is marshalled in the political arena) to better reflect our actual past?  As 
Bruyneel explores through critical engagement with W.E.B. Du Bois’s 
magnificent Black Reconstruction, it would certainly feature Americans (or 
Canadians or the French) revisiting particularly pivotal or foundational 
moments in their past, for example, in the U.S. case, the Civil War and 
Reconstruction.11 They would, as Du Bois does, challenge standard 
depictions of who and what had propelled these conflicts, how they 
unfolded, and what did not but might have transpired.  With Du Bois, it was 
the general strike of black people refusing to continue to work and then 
stealing themselves from plantations who while thought not to be political 
actors in fact altered the course and nature of the events of what many 
Southerners still call “the Northern War of Aggression.”  In the short period 
that followed, in an effort to eradicate their enslavement, black people 
pushed for and inhabited institutions that could have reconstructed the 
entire, not only the black, South into something actually resembling a 
democratic republic. At the same time, as Bruyneel astutely emphasizes, Du 
Bois and historical and contemporary figures who share his political 
sensibilities could further creolize their creolizing account. After all, what 
Du Bois celebrates as a splendid failure occurs simultaneously with the Sioux 
Nation’s successful effort to force the U.S. government into a peace 
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agreement that legally recognized their claim to territory. To engage in this 
more rigorous creolizing, they would have to pay due attention to the 
subjects and stories that remain liminal in their account, or those appearing 
only through their absent presence. More specifically, when discussing the 
relationship between ownership and political belonging, Du Bois mirrors, 
rather than challenges, the contours of settler memory. Rather than 
creolizing abolitionist and decolonizing approaches, he fails to connect how 
the land used to create the plantation South was “cleared” through forced 
removal of its original occupants. Similarly, his exploration of the unfulfilled 
promise of forty acres and a mule did not tie questions of expropriated labor 
to those of land dispossession and therefore could not consider whether 
forging an American present and future that better embodies a creolizing 
and therefore generalizing will would have to break fundamentally from 
conceptions of political standing tied to individualized private property 
rooted in the extraction of soil from America’s original occupants. These 
shortcomings are in ample display in the depictions of native peoples Keisha 
Lindsay and I have traced in the writings of 18th-and 19th-century New World 
black writers seeking to make a case for their own rightful place in the 
emergent U.S. nation.12   
Bruyneel’s reflections in this symposium are tied to larger ones that 
he is undertaking along with Glen Sean Coulthard in the spirit of Patrick 
Wolfe, Vine Deloria Jr., and George Manuel and Michael Posluns on the 
relationship of the “black” to the “red.”13  In exactly the way that creolizing 
analysis should unfold, the forging of solidarity requires first disentangling 
and then engaging with the historical consequences of the specific, discrete, 
and complementary workings of settler colonialism. For instance, if the aim 
with African-descended peoples in the U.S. was to extract labor 
indispensable to national development while radically segregating such 
people from ever actually forming part of the nation to which the state 
referred, the goal with native peoples was evacuation. For this reason, if 
Indians were first repeatedly “removed” beyond white borders, when they 
were territorially engulfed, they were to be made extinct through their 
assimilation or de-Indianizing.  For Deloria, while many black Americans 
sought full incorporation and membership in the U.S. polity through the 
initial stage of the Civil Rights movement, their Indian counterparts, in ways 
that resonated better with the nationalism of the Black Power movement, 
wanted to be left alone or outside the coercive embrace of the U.S. state.  In 
Manuel and Posluns, the fourth world that would emerge with aboriginal 
peoples globally anticipated the Zapatista idea of a world in which many 
worlds fit.  Inspired by revolutionary efforts in Tanzania to create a modern 
nation on a model distinct from those of Europe, it was to be one in which 
new technologies borne of human creativity could be used to express older 
values that prized the conditions of our continued existence over that which 
is novel or new. Crucially, for Manuel and Posluns, the desire to withdraw 
from the orbit of illegitimate occupying governments had nothing to do with 
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an impulse to be culturally pure or unchanging. Quite the opposite. As they 
argued so beautifully: cherishing a relationship with the land does not 
require continuing to use a wooden plough.  Indeed, they celebrated distinct 
ideas that emerged from the shared situation of being aboriginal.  They 
included in that category both those of whom they and other indigenous 
Canadians were aware (among them, the Maori, the Lapp, and the Welsh) 
and those whom they would still come to know.  In other words, the 
creolization that could and would still emerge required the deliberate 
rejection of political systems premised upon avowed decreolization. In this 
way, Manuel and Posluns’s analysis also shares much in common with 
Fanon, for whom the aim of colonization is to create a world of contraries or 
opposed, mutually exclusive universals that would not meet in relation.  
Through struggle against institutions that sought to make them real, 
contraries were turned into contradictions through which creolizing 
processes could and did unfold. In an older and more European-specific 
rendition of a similar point, Rousseau had argued that one could not forge a 
general will between people who thought all others were damned and the 
supposedly damned or between those who enriched themselves through 
immiserating others and the immiserated.  In each such instance, since the 
self-conception of the former was premised on being outside of relations 
with the others who constituted the majority of the relevant whole, they had 
to be resisted for vital political alternatives to emerge.  
Even if a revolutionary people can embody such creolizing 
relations, Michael Neocosmos asks whether these can be institutionalized or 
routinized in ways that do not banish a mobilized people into passivity. 
Neocosmos’s answer appears to be no. This is what states are.  This is what 
states do. We should therefore celebrate what are episodic moments of mass 
movements that generate concepts and experiences that exceed conditions 
and thinking that precedes and will follow them. Neocosmos does also offer 
the longer running model of the Haitian bossales who, within the technical 
orbit of a state, resisted its grasp and thereby its crushing logics.  However, 
if politics, as Neocosmos describes it, cannot be extended to suffuse the 
conditions of ongoing, mundane life, how are we to understand its actual 
reach?  Is it that, in fleeting moments, people cohere around shared political 
commitments regardless of their differential situations and can then recall 
this when the mobilization has passed? Or is it that self-governance can only 
continue where a decision is made to operate in the shadows of the 
predominant state system, not offering an offensive counter to it but 
operating in a refuge? 
Put differently, Neocosmos has made a highly compelling case for 
the indispensability of dialectical thinking and approaches to politics with 
which I could not agree more. At the same time, it is clear that Neocosmos 
and I have different responses to the question of whether there can be 
legitimate political institutions.  In Neocosmos’s account, emancipatory 
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popular politics emerges in moments that must be finite.  Efforts to translate 
these into state power, even when the leaders themselves are borne of this 
movement, inevitably collapse into a representative politics that sends the 
mobilized people back into the caves or into political passivity. Indeed, the 
newly instated, time and time again, retrench in direct proportion to the 
capaciousness of what generated them. This is not due to Max Weber’s 
concern with the routinization of charisma.  Instead the point is 
Rousseauian: popular sovereignty cannot be divided or represented. Failure 
to grasp this, for Neocosmos, leads Fanon into a mistaken view that frames 
the national bourgeoisie and its one-party state as a problem external to an 
otherwise revolutionary movement.  For Neocosmos, Fanon is wrong to 
frame these actors as having hijacked and betrayed what otherwise might 
have been, if the implications are that there could have been any people who 
or party that would have acted differently.  This is because it is an error, for 
Neocosmos, to treat revolutionary moments as something that can be made 
to endure, or as a transitional precursor transformed meaningfully into state 
power.  At the same time, in his view, what transpires in those fleeting 
moments is not an approximation of a general will or a common good or a 
mobilized people or national consciousness. These are achieved and those 
involved experience this process of becoming.   
Even as Rousseau described “the people” as dying from the 
moment of their inception and criticized governments as creating problems 
for the pursuit of the general will, he both described formerly colonized 
(Corsican) people whose general wills were still emergent and bothered to 
author a full-fledged portrait of a polity. The text was replete with doubt 
and qualification, revealing more about profoundly misleading conceptions 
of liberty than confidence in the models he delineated.  But if emancipatory 
politics is not a narrow politics of experience, surely we do have to tend to 
better and worse ways of facilitating its extension. Without discussion of 
institutionalization, such emancipatory events would appear to collapse into 
the kind of regulative ideals that Neocosmos associates with the limits of 
analytical thought: they would enable us to affirm that another world is 
possible since, for a fleeting moment, we witnessed and knew it.  
For most participants who undertake such activity at great risk, the 
exhilaration of the moment is not primarily a matter of being unburdened by 
divisive identities unleashed from the seismic weight of the colonial past 
and more about creating the conditions of a less compromised freedom and 
of fuller self-determination and dignity. Their politics, then, is not only 
about a collective subject mobilized in pursuit of the common good but the 
series of actions that set in motion expanded options for those doing the 
struggling.  When the mobilization that cannot endure has come to an end, 
they should return to functional homes and clean water and excellent 
schools and a reprieve from state violence.  
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It is true that Fanon devoted more time to diagnosing what was 
wrong with the national bourgeoisie than the kinds of institutions that he 
thought could give continued expression to national consciousness.  At the 
same time, he did offer some guidance.  It came in his emphasis on assuring 
that it was citizens who undertook collective decision-making and planning. 
It was evident in his urging to refuse the hiring of foreign expertise if this 
would stall opportunities and divert resources that could be used to develop 
local skilled labor.  Efficient solutions were to be eschewed if they did not 
extend the political thinking of the people as a whole. These comments are 
reminiscent of Rousseau’s efforts to envision how a sovereign people could 
continue to be self-legislating. Logistical considerations had to follow more 
primary commitments, even if this required, as was supposedly the case in 
the Roman republic, citizens participating from the rooftops. There were 
also Fanon’s cautions against collapsing into colonial divides between urban 
elites and rural majorities and his push to have, instead of a fixed political 
capital, one that moved throughout the physical territory of the nation. 
When he argues that those seeking to govern themselves should not just 
adopt a capitalist or Soviet model of economy and that each generation must 
live up to its mission, the message was that physically ousting settlers was 
not sufficient. Revolutionary struggle meant transforming the society from 
the bottom up, guided by a national consciousness that would transmute 
anti-colonial nationalism into a way of organizing a society for all, especially 
the nobodies.   
If we take Fanon’s sociogenetic diagnosis and argument seriously, 
then, it must extend to political institutions or to the potential meaning of 
the state.  Just as these have changed their nature across time, they can still 
be altered. Or, we may not have exhausted their potential forms. Peopled by 
human beings, it is they or we who must make them run and who are 
thereby responsible for their character. We therefore cannot treat them with 
existential seriousness or as features of an unchanging natural world. If the 
specific concern is with how institutionalizing power and decision-making 
banishes collective agency, then that is the challenge to which our designs 
must directly respond.  But to treat all political institutions as if they amount 
to the flawed, antipolitical, and illegitimate same is to fail to heed Lewis 
Gordon’s analysis of Fanon’s challenge to the anti-statism of Friedrich 
Engels.14  
One central difference in Neocosmos and my reading of Rousseau 
is technical. Rousseau hated cosmopolitan politics and any other forms that 
tended, as Julia Suárez-Krabbe diagnoses, to mistake the internationalizing 
of a particular idea or practice for its inherent universalism.15  For Rousseau, 
polities, political identities, and political wills aimed to be general, consisting 
in what meaningful differences had in common. There were generalities that 
were narrower—so government officials shared a general will tied to their 
professional location rather than the society itself—and this often made 
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them obstacles to the pursuit of an actual general will.  At the same time, 
what mediate the particular and universal and could last, even if it remained 
fragile and prone to abuse and muting, were generality and the general will. 
This informs my own view of the relationship between generalizing and 
creolizing. While it is true that narrow identitatarianism is dislodged by 
arrays of people who share political commitments that seek an enlarged 
common good, this does not involve a transcendence of identity altogether. 
What emerges instead is a way of expressing who and what it is to be 
Algerian or South African or American that is organically tied to what is 
local while being open to contributing sources that always exceed narrowing 
hegemonic accounts of the relevant nations. Loving the land does not require 
wielding a wooden plough. 
Rousseau and Fanon are exemplary figures for exploring the idea 
of creolization, as Neocosmos states, because of how fundamentally 
dialectical their thinking was.  As Neocosmos describes it, they break 
fundamentally from analytical thought, demanding that we think beyond 
what we can experience or have known.  In Rousseau’s view, skepticism 
toward such an approach, which prevailed and prevails, is to reason as 
tyrants who seek to rationalize their particular abuse as endemic to the 
nature of power and politics itself. But, if the whole point about 
emancipatory politics or praxis is that it exceeds what was thinkable, it does 
so, first, in a dialectical relationship to existent ideas and ideals, even if 
framed in the negative.  This is what I mean by a regulative ideal: anti-
colonial struggle, in its initial moments, mobilizes an idea of the nation, 
which is more defensible than a country run for the benefit of foreign 
occupiers.  If political participation is what makes a human being an adult, 
the argument continues, no one should be barred and one then opens the 
polity to the challenge of facilitating the different way of undertaking 
political life that must necessarily result.  In other words, if most political 
ideals have only existed in compromised and contradictory form, in 
revolutionary action, these are reinvoked with the aim of more actually 
actualizing them. To say that emancipatory politics is mobilized around 
regulative ideals of what it is no longer to be enslaved or colonized is not to 
say that in it those mobilized don’t experience what it is to be or become a 
sovereign people. There is no tension between these claims. 
A dialectical reading would also mean that the realization of an 
actual general or creolizing will by one generation will inevitably be met by 
subsequent defeats. But politics is not only evident in the successful 
moment.  Since, after all, what erupts positively and progressively only does 
so through considerable intermediary efforts and organizing. Through these 
efforts historical lessons that would be rendered invisible by those who 
would prefer they be forgotten are instead retold, rekindling the imagination 
of people who might otherwise believe that to think like anything other than 
a tyrant is naïve. 
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At the same time, I am under no illusions. In our world, states 
continue to act in kleptocratic and predatory ways, often increasing rather 
than counteracting the vulnerability of most citizens.  Still, we know that 
they must work otherwise, even if we are not certain that they can. Ngũgĩ 
wa Thiong’o captures this predicament beautifully in his many novels and 
critical essays. Sonia Dayan-Herzbrun couldn’t be more accurate in her 
celebration of his effective creolization of Marxism: of Ngũgĩ’s ability to 
grasp structural relations diagnosed by Marx, but in language that grabs you 
by the guts and that explores expropriation and alienation in the context of 
neocolonial life through sustained attention to language, to the distinct 
potential roles of women and men, and to different forms and natures of 
knowing.  For instance, review the passage quoted in Dayan-Herzbrun’s 
essay: “It is part of that struggle for that world in which my health is not 
dependent on another’s leprosery; my cleanliness not on another’s maggot-
ridden body; and my humanity not on the buried humanity of others.”  
Dayan-Herzbrun rightly emphasizes that it was in response to the persistent 
efforts of a young woman who insisted that Ngũgĩ teach outside of the 
academy, where in the Queen’s English he served only the children of the 
Kenyan bourgeoisie, that brought him in direct and ongoing contact with 
ordinary people who enlarged his conception of political life and action. 
This assessment of Ngũgĩ’s contributions is exemplified especially 
well in his 2006 Wizard of the Crow, a book that explicitly explores the 
seemingly impossible through pitting a voraciously corrupt neocolonial 
class that will settle for nothing less than absolute rule against those whose 
resistant aims must be and are thoroughly creolizing.16 Consider the 
specifics: The Ruler, who remains nameless over the course of hundreds of 
pages, aims to consolidate complete control, insisting that the Country of 
Abruriria and he are referred to synonymously.  His own self-aggrandizing 
version of contentious political events are “the news,” while his prisons 
overflow with all variants of political dissidents. He regularly thins the 
ranks of his own citizens simply because he can.  In one particularly extreme 
genuflecting moment, one of his ministers recommended that the Ruler be 
considered the author of any and everything that might be written or 
thought within the bounds of Abruriria. While everyone knows that the 
Ruler is sick, his pawns seek to divert attention from this obvious truth 
through announcing that plans are underway to erect a contemporary 
Tower of Babel that would triumph where biblical efforts had failed. Once 
finished, it would not only be the envy of the world, but would also put the 
Ruler in direct and ongoing contact with G-d—proximity G-d is assumed to 
welcome.  What is more, anticipating the absurdities of the promises of the 
current president of the United States, it is announced that Banks of Europe 
and the United States would foot the bill! Despite the clear impossibility of 
the undertaking, the Ruler and his peons devote all their energies to this 
seemingly constructive activity.   
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In stark contrast to their illegitimacy, there are Kamiti and 
Nyawira, young adults seeking neither wealth nor dominion. He is an 
educated and thinking man who must seek employment from crooks and is 
plagued by an ability to smell the ethical character of people, most of whom, 
in being willing to be bought, literally stink. He can also sense possibility.  
He smells this first as a scent of flowers that Nyawira exudes. He is able to 
create his own occupation through creolizing the traditional role of sorcerer, 
in an environment in which none wish to admit that they all seek a piece of 
such power.  Nyawira, however, as a true Fanonian, insists that one cannot 
heal individual people without mending their social world. This initially 
restorative politics must be one of unity that guides the deployment of force.  
It should grow from knowledge conceived as the discovery of magic within 
the ordinary and as emerging out of all people and from multiple places as a 
shared, collective asset. For Kamiti this involves continuing the legacy of 
cross-pollinating East Indian and East African traditions in an indigenous 
African politics that emerges through a dialogue with rather than 
subservient relationship to custodians of tradition. It must be built through 
more than relations of patronage in which some are always accruing 
indebtedness and instead nurture an infrastructure to enable citizens to take 
what they need with a duty to contribute what they can. The practical and 
romantic relationship and collaboration of Kamiti and Nyawira as portrayed 
in The Wizard of the Crow instantiates the possibility of combining a 
humanistic openness to resources of magic and spirituality with one that is 
primarily political.  Their combined efforts culminate in tentative and 
gorgeous images of an alternative to what will be more of the same vampiric 
contempt for the future that institutionalizes terror to create situations that 
are ungovernable.  
The text, then, offers insight into how a resistance movement that 
drew on the political mythos of Abruriria seized and made space within the 
vacuum created by necropolitical rule.  In each instance, their performances 
demonstrated the shittiness of using a state solely as a means to advance 
one’s own very narrow economic interests and demonstrated that alienated 
people who have determined not to tolerate the further abuse of what 
remains of their country can wield immense disruptive and potentially 
constructive power.  The story also affirms that democratic theory must also 
be economic theory, that discussion of the kinds of practices that should 
constitute the former must also address the material conditions that are their 
prerequisite. In ways that have much resonance for contemporary residents 
of the United States, The Wizard of the Crow forces the reader to imagine 
mundane life in the heights and depths of political absurdity, in which the 
desires of a human being to be like a god dictate the fates and lives of 
millions.  The Ruler’s and his minister’s strange and outlandish creativity is 
at times genuinely impressive, but it relies consistently on the disabling of 
all others. The story also illustrates the ongoing value of the idea of political 
legitimacy—it may seldom be embodied, but when it is, it is immediately 
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recognized and affirmed without coercion. Of necessity, it is profoundly 
creolizing, emerging out of an ability to forge out of a fractured 
environment, a vision of how differently collective life might be led, not 
simply drawing from ideas and practices of discrete national communities 
but from distinct domains of life, often thought to be profoundly opposed.  
In Rousseau’s words, it would be reasoning as tyrants and in Fanon’s 
it would be a failure to be adequately sociogenetic in our approach, if we 
assume that states must always function in the same way. As Boaventura de 
Sousa Santos has repeatedly pointed out: colonialism exploits and alienates 
in multiple, discrete ways so that effective counters to it must figure out how 
to speak among these idioms so that their complementarity does not only 
serve the already forceful.17 Creolization describes moments when this is 
achieved through collective efforts to grasp and then make material 
conditions that enable a more and more generalizing will, attentive always 
to those most prone to remain present only in their absences.  
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